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Egypt, once on the margins of Near Eastern geopolitics since the Arab Spring, is now playing a crucial role in mediation between Israelis and Palestinians, particularly in the complex issue of Palestinian refugees’ possible exodus from the Gaza Strip to Sinai. Cairo’s position has diminished since the 2011 riots, but it remains crucial in the region’s balance. The Al Sisi regime’s role in the resolution of the previous Gaza crisis and the recent release of two Israeli hostages has made mediation increasingly fundamental.
Despite the presence of other diplomatic actors such as Qatar, Turkey, and the Gulf countries, Egypt’s activism has led to the convening of a Peace Summit in its capital. Qatar’s presence in Doha, led by the Hamas political office, has both positive and negative effects. On the positive side, it allows Qatar greater diplomatic and negotiating leverage, but also raises concern and suspicion on the Western side. Turkey, due to its ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, presents itself as a less balanced mediator than Egypt. Saudi Arabia is currently in a delicate position, and Cairo remains the main mediator in the Gaza crisis.
The December presidential elections highlight the importance of the Arab square in Egypt, which is not sympathetic towards Tel Aviv due to the failure to resolve the Palestinian question and the country’s history of four wars against Israel. The complex Egyptian social structure includes a historic and increasingly small bourgeois, urban, and well-educated component, as well as a rural extraction or recently urbanized component, which is poorer and less educated.
The Israeli air force’s disproportionate response to the October 7 attacks exacerbated the hostility of the Arab masses towards Tel Aviv. The current Egyptian government must balance the demands of the streets, the crude games of realpolitik, and limited hopes of peace.
Israel is pushing for Egypt to “host” the Palestinians from the Sinai Strip, and some journalists have highlighted the Egyptian refusal to host the nearly two million refugees from Gaza as evidence of a lack of “Arab solidarity” towards the Palestinian issue. While regimes in power in Arab countries have historically paid more attention to realpolitik than solidarity towards the Palestinian people, the question is more complex than presented by journalistic vulgarity. Factors should be considered in this regard.
Hamas, a local offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, is considered an enemy of the Egyptian regime. The organization has been subjected to harsh repression, leading to a freeze in relations between Cairo and Ankara. This has pushed President Al Sisi to support General Haftar’s faction in Libya. Sinai, an unstable territory, is weak due to its demilitarization and political vacuum, where smuggling and illicit trafficking thrive.
There is fear that Netanyahu’s executive’s intentions could encourage an exodus of Gaza population towards Egypt, leading to a subsequent occupation of the Strip and the adoption of the classic policy of a fait accompli. The Egyptian President may have counter-proposed the Negev desert as the most suitable asylum for refugees fleeing the bombing of Gaza. Al-Sisi fears similar events to “Black September” in Jordan and the 1975 civil war in Lebanon could occur in the medium/long term. If the situation degenerates, conditions could create that would make an Israeli military intervention on Egyptian territory necessary, potentially affecting the scope of the distant Camp David agreements.
