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The diplomatic feud between Japan and China over Japan’s discharge of treated wastewater from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor into the Pacific Ocean in August 2023 demonstrates how both governments have used public diplomacy to secure their legitimacy among their citizens. Japan’s strategy aims to appeal to scientific authority and emphasizes its tragic history with nuclear power to convince an international audience, while China portrays Japan’s decision as a unilateral nuclear threat to lives and livelihoods in the region to convince a mainly domestic audience.
On 24 August 2023, Japan began releasing an initial instalment of treated water used to cool down the reactor into the Pacific Ocean. After nearly a decade, it became clear that there was no more land for storage, leading the Japanese government to engage with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to secure permission to release the water into the Pacific Ocean after leaching it of most of its harmful radioactive elements through the Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS).
Japan invited South Korean experts to visit its plant and held consultations with China and Russia, leading to South Korea’s official approval of its wastewater disposal plan despite widespread opposition. China has been resolute in its opposition to Japan’s plan to discharge nuclear waste from its nuclear facilities, citing the country’s history of being a victim of nuclear weapons. Since the release of the plan, China has publicly criticised Japan and launched protests and vandalism against the Japanese Embassy and Japanese schools in China. Tokyo has reported over 100,000 cases of prank calls made by China to various municipalities and businesses, with most callers using abusive language to address the Japanese side. Tokyo has escalated its rhetoric against Beijing’s actions and hinted at taking China to the World Trade Organisation for what it termed as Beijing’s “politically-motivated” attacks.
Japan and China have launched diplomatic campaigns against the discharge, with Japan promoting its stance through traditional and social media, while China uses international platforms. The most prominent rhetorical strategy used by Japanese public diplomacy is an appeal to scientific rationality, which is best seen in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ X feed. This strategy claims that opposition to Japan’s actions is unscientific and unreasonable, and that Japan has the scientific ‘high ground’ in line with Enlightenment values. Another strategy applied by Japanese public diplomacy is the accentuation of Japan’s history with nuclear power, which involves reclaiming Japan’s victim status using the example of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and minimizing the downsides of nuclear power.
The second thread in this text revolves around anti-discharge protests organized by anti-nuclear power groups in East Asia, which they view as blind opposition to nuclear power’s role as a viable renewable energy source. They argue that China and South Korea’s opposition to the Fukushima discharge stems from an irrational urge to paint nuclear power as inherently unsafe, denying countries like Japan the right to energy security. They argue that nuclear power has been responsible for less deaths per capita than coal or oil, and that nuclear power represents the best hope for renewable energy transitions until more radical technologies come to fruition.
Japan’s public diplomacy on this issue has a pronounced external dimension, with high-quality translations of IAEA factsheets and promotional videos posted on social media outlets such as You Tube and X. The goal is to isolate criticism of its actions to a few governments, which can be safely disregarded as ‘crying wolf’ over a non-issue.
China’s strategies are overlapping but with inverted objectives, with the first strategy leveraging the global nuclear taboo possessed by educated individuals. China has consistently attempted to portray Japan’s actions as a nuclear threat, invoking the harmful effects of radiation on human health and the environment. This strategy is highly effective as it generates a categorical claim against which no reasoned, scientific counter-claim can operate.
The Chinese narrative of Japan’s actions in the Pacific Ocean is rooted in its historical culpability for military aggression since 1937. This narrative portrays Japan as oppressing its neighbors through unilateral actions, such as releasing hazardous materials into the ocean, harming lives and livelihoods. China’s public diplomacy on this issue is not primarily directed at convincing international audiences, but also at convincing its domestic audience that the government of President Xi Jinping is capable of standing up to the traditional oppressor in the region.
China uses domestic social media platforms like Weibo and WeChat to spread propaganda about Japan’s sea pollution, using morphed radiation victim images and recycled footage. The phone call campaign is coordinated internally to drive up participation in a new form of “patriotic resistance” to the wartime invader. China welcomes the concerned actions of anti-nuclear groups around the world, but aims to stoke anti-Japanese feelings among its own people to achieve a “rally around the flag” effect.
