28
As the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) approach Gaza City, the start of urban fighting is expected due to the complexity of the urban scenario. Urban areas are often characterized by a large variety of buildings, streets, alleys, and narrow passages, making navigation and the planning of military operations difficult. The reduced lines of vision, concealment of defensive elements, asymmetric threats, and complex logistics and supplies make it difficult for invaders to identify and neutralize them.
The Marine Corps’ experience in Iraq and Mosul, where intense clashes occurred in a house-to-house context and a siege for months, demonstrates the risks of urban combat. The IDF’s fight is expected to be harder and longer than the Second Battle of Fallujah and more violent than the Mosul offensive, as the sprawling labyrinth of Gaza tunnels represents an aspect of the war that has not been addressed by the US military during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
A more appropriate parallel is the Vietnam War, when the Viet Cong tunnel systems, particularly those in the Cu Chi district of Ho Chi Minh City (then Saigon), played a crucial role in US defeat. The risks of urban combat can be traced back to the experiences of the Marine Corps in Iraq and Mosul.
The Cu Chi Tunnels, located on the outskirts of South Vietnam’s capital, were a complex network of narrow passages and hidden traps, used for living quarters, supply storage, and bases of operations. The US Army’s superiority in bomber aircraft, artillery, and mortars has become ineffective against the “underground labyrinth tactic.” The Gaza tunnels, similar to the Cu Chi tunnels, were developed before Hamas gained control of the region in 2007.
Hamas float over the heavily-fortified border with Israel using motorised paragliders
They serve various purposes, including smuggling weapons, generating revenue from goods smuggled across Gaza’s border with Egypt, and command and control. The most concerning aspect for Israel is the combat tunnels, which were crucial in operations like the capture of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in 2006. These tunnels date from the late 1990s to the early 2000s and served as conduits for smuggling goods and weapons between Gaza and Egypt. Hamas’ investment in these tunnels, financed largely by Iran, is a testament to their value. After the 2014 Gaza conflict, Israel implemented security measures, particularly aiming to control the final destination of construction materials.
The softer soil on the Gaza coast makes the tunnels in Gaza more concentrated and complex, making fighting in these tunnels more suffocating for Hamas. The full depth and breadth of the underground network remain unknown to the IDF, and some estimates suggest over 300 miles of tunnels under Gaza. Hamas’ engineering prowess and strategic investment have become evident, as seen with the Viet Cong. The presence of civilians, including women, children, and the elderly, as well as humanitarian workers and news cameras, makes any large-scale military operation full of moral, ethical, and political pitfalls
